

State Dept. review completed

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NARCOTICS COUNTRY PAPERS - NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Afghanistan

Egypt

Greece

India

Iran

Israel

Lebanon

Nepal

Pakistan

Turkey

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BRIEFING PAPER

NARCOTICS COUNTRY PAPER

AFGHANISTAN

1. ILLICIT DRUG PROBLEM

Reliable statistics on opium production and trade in Afghanistan are not available. Estimates of acreage devoted to poppy cultivation range widely, and production estimates run from about 50 to as much as 200 metric tons of raw opium gum per year. Much of the poppy cultivation is in relatively remote parts of the country where administrative control is weak, and one of the areas suspected of being a major producer is still primarily organized along tribal lines.

Domestic use of opium is believed to be small, and there is no evidence of the processing of morphine base or the manufacture of heroin in the country. Hashish is readily available, cheap, and locally consumed to a larger, although still relatively small degree. Both consumption and trafficking are reported to be increasing, with itinerant foreign visitors, especially young hippies, being the largest known contributors to both. Most Afghan opium is believed to be smuggled to Iran where it is consumed, but significant quantities of hashish are smuggled directly to Europe and the United States.

2. DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS

The production and trade of opium are illegal in Afghanistan, but enforcement measures are not effective. The Government of Afghanistan is becoming increasingly aware of the problem, and has recently established two cabinet committees to deal with it. Seizures of illicit drugs have increased recently with a couple of dramatic raids made during early 1972. Nevertheless, a comprehensive control effort has not yet been inaugurated, and it is expected that Afghanistan will require considerable outside assistance to mount an effective control program.

Afghanistan is a party to the Single Convention and is participating in the Plenipotentiary Conference to Amend the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs, 1961. The Government has recently indicated its interest in joining as an observer the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs ad hoc Committee on Illicit Traffic in Near and Middle East.

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Although there are a number of proposals under consideration, we know of no bilateral or multilateral suppression programs underway in Afghanistan. There is, however, a police advisory team from a Western country resident in Afghanistan, and a full complement of UN specialized agencies with programs in Afghanistan, which might be helpful as control programs are developed.

3. U.S. PROGRAMS

A representative of the U.S. Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs (BNDD) has been stationed in Kabul since 1970 as part of our international narcotics control program, and a second officer is being assigned. In a more general sense, the AID technical assistance program has as one of its major objectives assisting Afghanistan develop more effective government administration which will have application for better narcotics control. We are discussing with the Government of Afghanistan how we might be helpful in controlling the narcotics problem, and are hopeful that cooperative measures will soon be undertaken.

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QUESTION: How much opium from Afghanistan reaches the U.S. drug market?

ANSWER: So far as we know, opium from Afghanistan has not found its way into the heroin traffic reaching the United States. It is of generally low quality, making it difficult to transform into heroin.

QUESTION: Are young Americans involved in the hippy-drug business in Afghanistan?

ANSWER: Unfortunately, young Americans are the largest group resident in Kabul for the apparent sole purpose of obtaining drugs cheaply. Many of them have been used as couriers for the hashish traffic. Perhaps even more unfortunate are the young who are drawn into the drug business more or less by accident. These are youth trying to learn about the world through travel, without the necessary resources. They have also been recruited as couriers.

QUESTION: What are the penalties for illegal narcotics activities in Afghanistan?

ANSWER: Penalties for Afghans can be very severe under Islamic law, but few arrests are made. Foreigners caught smuggling narcotics out of Afghanistan receive small fines and the loss of the contraband plus short periods of imprisonment while awaiting prosecution, but so far no sentences to prison have been handed down.

QUESTION: Why does Afghanistan permit these hippies to break its laws and get away with such lenient treatment?

ANSWER: The Afghan tradition calls for hospitality to all strangers, and although Afghan officials and private citizens deeply resent the corrupting influence of foreign hippies on Afghan youth, the Government has hoped that sending countries could somehow control their wandering youth.

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EGYPT

1. ILLICIT DRUG PROBLEM

Production of illicit drugs in Egypt is negligible and transit through Egypt is limited to small amounts of hashish which go to Libya. Egypt has 150,000 opium addicts for whom five to six tons of raw opium is annually imported illegally, chiefly from Turkey but some also from Iran; about one quarter of the illegally imported opium is seized by the Egyptian government. Hashish, imported illegally from Lebanon, is readily available and widely used by adult males; Egyptian authorities seize twelve to fifteen tons annually. The use and availability of opium derivatives, synthetic drugs, amphetamines, etc. is negligible.

2. DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS

Egyptian customs and border police serve as a primary line of defense against illegal importation of narcotics. The Ministry of the Interior, Anti-Narcotics Administration is headed by a Major General of the police. It has three departments: investigation, intelligence, and foreign affairs with 35 branch offices in the governorates. It has the power to investigate, arrest, and detain. The Egyptian government is aware of the drug control problem and interested in solving it. Our most useful consultations on amending the Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs have been with the Egyptian government.

3. U.S. DRUG CONTROL PROGRAMS

In the absence of any drugs transiting from Egypt to the U.S., and of diplomatic relations, our assistance to Egypt in the drug control area is limited this year to training one Egyptian Interior Ministry officer, one Egyptian Customs officer and an Egyptian journalist in appropriate U.S. programs. We agreed in 1930 with the Egyptian government to exchange intelligence relating to illegal drug traffic.

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GREECE

1. ILLICIT DRUG PROBLEM

There is no significant production or consumption of narcotics in Greece. The Greeks themselves are not prone to use drugs and their use by foreigners has been curtailed by a stiff drug prevention act. Should the Turkish-Bulgarian route for opium traffic to Europe be closed, Greece could possibly become an important transit route.

2. DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS

The Greek Customs authorities are making serious attempts at controlling drug traffic through Greece and are cooperating closely with the United States Customs and BNDD to improve their capabilities. The Greek efforts are complicated by the enormous flow of tourists through the country during the summer months (nearly 3,000,000 arrivals in 1971).

3. U.S. PROGRAMS

As mentioned above, the United States is assisting the Greek government to improve its ability to control the traffic of drugs through Greece. We are presently providing training material and appropriate intelligence information as well as reinforcing our working relationship with the Greek enforcement agencies.

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NARCOTICS COUNTRY PAPER

INDIA

1. ILLEGIT DRUG PROBLEM

The illegal movement of opium in and out of India is small in relation to internal production and consumption. About 5 to 10 metric tons enters from Pakistan and much smaller quantities enter from Nepal. The amount smuggled out has been estimated at 10 to 20 metric tons, with about half going to each of the Arabian Peninsula and the Far East. Small, but increasing quantities of hashish are being intercepted in possession of "hippie" travelers and in outgoing mail.

India's consumption of illicit opium at around 200 metric tons a year amounts to less than .015 of an ounce per capita. While heavy use is reportedly rare -- due to its social unacceptability in many areas -- it is believed that crude forms of opium have long been widely consumed. Also, "bhang," a mild variety of marijuana, and "ganga," a stronger form, are most common. Hashish has long been on the India scene and still represents a limited problem.

2. DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS

The cultivation, processing, sale, possession and use of opium and marijuana and their derivatives are illegal except under Government supervision. All States have enacted narcotics control laws similar to those of the Central Government. Although provisions against opium seem well designed and enforced, those against marijuana, hashish and less refined forms are permissive and loosely administered. Maximum penalties rarely exceed three years and a fine.

The production and sale of raw opium are controlled relatively effectively by two main devices. First, cultivation is licensed, and a minimum output of 20 kilograms

per hectare is required to retain a license. Second, a price incentive scale encourages sale of extra yields to the Government. Further, the scale has been shifted upward sharply in the past few years.

India has signed the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs and complies with its provisions. Its annual reports to the UN under this convention contain a detailed account of India's preventive measures, illicit traffic and quantities of drugs intercepted. While India's attitude toward international regulation of narcotics has been constructive, it would likely object to the total suppression of licit production and trade in view of its substantial share of the world trade in legal opium.

3. US PROGRAMS

There are no US drug control programs in India.

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IRAN

1. ILLICIT DRUG PROBLEM

Iran is a victim nation with a large number of domestic opium addicts and a growing number of heroin addicts. In 1955 cultivation of the poppy in Iran was banned. Although the ban was enforced, a lively smuggling trade from Turkey and Afghanistan developed which proved beyond Iran's capacity to control. Because of this, Iran in 1969 resumed legal cultivation of the opium poppy. Approximately one-third of Iran's declining opium addict population is now maintained on licitly produced domestic opium; the remaining two-thirds receive their opium from illicit foreign sources. There are approximately 50,000 heroin addicts, and their number is increasing. Such evidence as there is indicates that the heroin addicts tend to be younger, and are concentrated in urban areas; the opium addicts were much more numerous a generation ago, and are now mainly older people in rural areas. There is a danger that, with the Turks phasing out of opium production, the demand will shift to more Eastern suppliers and Iran may become a conduit for narcotics originating in Afghanistan and Pakistan and destined for Europe and the United States. There is no evidence that Iranian-produced opium enters the illicit international traffic at present.

2. DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS

Iran in 1969 introduced Draconian measures in an effort to crack down on the smugglers, concurrently with its resumption of domestic opium production. Since 1969 over one hundred convicted smugglers have been executed by firing squad, and the traffic from Turkey into Iran has been greatly curtailed owing to increased cooperation between their governments. The long Iranian border with Afghanistan remains a problem because of the difficult terrain and because the

smugglers offer well-organized armed resistance. The Iranians have plans to up-grade their capabilities for policing this border. In 1971 two helicopters were purchased from the U.S. Army for use in border surveillance, and the Gendarmerie plans to acquire more in 1972. The Iranian Government has announced its readiness to re-impose a ban on opium poppy cultivation as soon as its neighbors have succeeded in significantly reducing the flow of illicit drugs into Iran. The Iranian Government has taken a responsible and helpful position in international organizations dealing with narcotics, and has recently agreed to co-sponsor the U.S.-initiated "consensus package" amendments to the Single Convention on Narcotics. Iran has also agreed to participate in the Ad Hoc Middle East Committee of the Council on Narcotic Drugs.

3. U.S. DRUG CONTROL PROGRAM

We have proposed to the Iranian Government a program of close cooperation in drug control matters and the initial response of the Iranians has been entirely favorable. We envisage providing training to Iranian Gendarmerie, Customs, and Police officials; advice in intelligence collection; increased border surveillance capability; and perhaps advice in treatment and rehabilitation. There are presently in Iran: a U.S. Narcotics Advisor to the Iranian Gendarmerie, a BNDD Special Agent, an HEW psychiatrist working on rehabilitation problems, and there may be some additional assistance to the Iranian Customs Service in the future. We are encouraged by the cooperative attitude of the Iranian Government and are hopeful that an effective drug control program will be established in Iran.

QUESTION: Is there any leakage into the illicit traffic from legal Iranian opium production?

ANSWER: To the best of our knowledge there is none. The Iranian system of controls is very strict; licenses are required, and these are only given to cooperative-type farms, not to individual farmers, thus making control easier. The crop is harvested in the presence of police and the opium is kept under lock and key at all phases of its processing. Since the price paid to the cooperative farmer by the Government is higher than the illicit price, and since internal demand is greater than domestic production, leakage is highly unlikely.

QUESTION: Is the Royal Family involved in the narcotics traffic?

ANSWER: We have no evidence that might lend credence to this scurrilous charge. Last week the Swiss police reportedly issued a warrant for the arrest of a man who holds the courtesy title of "Prince" because of his position as a leading member of an important tribe in Iran; he is not, however, related in any way to the Iranian Royal Family. Apparently the warrant was not served owing to his diplomatic status. The facts of this incident remain far from clear and we have only sketchy press reports to go on; in any event it did not occur within U.S. jurisdiction. We understand that the Iranian Government is conducting an investigation and may have a statement at a later date. We have no reason to believe that the Royal Family is in any way implicated in this case. We believe the severity of Iran's anti-illicit narcotics laws and their vigorous enforcement accurately reflect the attitude of the Shah and his government toward this matter.

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ISRAEL

1. ILICIT DRUG PROBLEM

Israel is not a known producer of either opium poppies or cannabis (hashish), nor is it believed to be a transit state for opium or opium derivatives. Limited quantities of hashish do, however, enter the country from neighboring Arab states. Sporadic attempts to re-export some of this hashish continue to decline as a result of alert Israeli customs procedures and publicity given convictions for drug trafficking. Similarly, on the domestic side, the relatively rare incidence of hashish use by Israeli citizens and foreign tourists does not presently constitute a significant problem.

2. DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS

Israeli frontiers are among the best policed in the world. As suggested above, the efforts of the Israeli Defense Forces, Border Police and customs officials have proven quite effective in keeping the drug situation in Israel under control. Moreover, the Israeli authorities use established Interpol channels to exchange promptly and efficiently information on international narcotics matters.

3. U.S. PROGRAMS

There are no specific U.S. programs aimed at assisting Israel in the field of narcotics control, nor would current circumstances justify the establishment of any such programs. As a matter of policy, the American Embassy does, however, take advantage of appropriate occasions to demonstrate our interest in continued Israeli vigilance with regard to illicit drug practices.

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LEBANON

1. ILLICIT DRUG PROBLEM

Lebanon plays a relatively minor role in illicit hard drug production, processing or trafficking. Turkish opium smuggled into Lebanon has decreased markedly over the past few years as alternative routes for smuggling opium from Turkey to Western Europe have been developed. However, Lebanon is a major producer of hashish, the majority of which (some 200 tons annually) is smuggled into Egypt. In spite of stringent Lebanese narcotics laws, the Government of Lebanon has generally been ineffective in controlling production and large-scale trafficking of hashish.

2. DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS

The Lebanese police includes a small narcotics section with which the BNDD Attaché's office maintains good relations. Arrests of traffickers are made in cooperation with BNDD in the Beirut area. Seizures and arrests in France and other countries result from information developed by the BNDD representatives. Control efforts in Lebanon are complicated by mountainous border areas, by a laissez faire mercantilist tradition and by lingering vestiges of a feudalistic system which often lends considerable protection in high places to local producers of hashish. Our Embassy is maintaining liaison on the drug problem with the French Embassy in Beirut.

3. U.S. PROGRAMS

There are no U.S. programs aimed specifically at improving the training, equipment and communications of the narcotics section of the Lebanese police. However, we have under consideration upgrading the capabilities of Lebanese customs officials by offering training in the United States. In addition, we are urging stricter enforcement of existing narcotics laws by the Government of Lebanon.

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QUESTION: Is opium produced in Lebanon?

ANSWER: No. However, a small amount of Turkish opium and morphine base are smuggled into Lebanon directly. The opiates do not remain in Lebanon but are shipped to processing laboratories in France.

QUESTION: What are we doing to control this problem?

ANSWER: The BNDD has representatives in Beirut who are coordinating their efforts with Lebanese police. Seizures and arrests in France have resulted from information developed by the BNDD representatives in Beirut.

QUESTION: Isn't Lebanon a major producer of hashish?

ANSWER: Yes. It is estimated that Lebanon produces some 200 tons annually of hashish, most of which is smuggled into Egypt. The Lebanese Government is attempting to control cultivation, but efforts are complicated by mountainous border areas, by a laissez faire mercantilist tradition and by lingering vestiges of a feudalistic system which often lends considerable protection in high places to local producers of hashish.

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NEPAL

1. ILLICIT DRUG PROBLEM

There is little information available on the production, movement, abuse and control of narcotic drugs in Nepal. The country is not mentioned as a source of production of opium in reports on the drug problem. However, the opium poppy reportedly is grown illegally in valleys and foothills of Nepal near producing areas in Northern India; and small quantities are believed smuggled into India. Hashish reportedly is also produced illicitly in Nepal, and some has been intercepted entering India.

2. DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS

According to a United Nations source, the Government of Nepal prohibited the unauthorized cultivation of cannabis in 1960, but little is known about controls and their enforcement. Nepal and India consult, periodically, on measures to limit the illicit traffic of opium and marijuana drugs into India. Control is difficult, however, owing to the terrain and long border.

3. US PROGRAMS

None.

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PAKISTAN

1. ILLICIT DRUG PROBLEM

According to the Government of Pakistan, opium is produced under official control, with poppy cultivation licensed by provincial governments and the raw opium delivered to the government. After processing, the opium is disposed of through licensed vendors to registered addicts. About 2,500 acres of poppies, mostly in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), are licensed under this system, with a reported yield of 10 metric tons of raw opium gum. Pakistan does not have a quota for the export of opium, and is committed to eliminate the use of opium for purposes other than medical and scientific by 1979.

There are two additional sources of opium production which the government does not control: (1) unlicensed production in the NWFP and (2) unauthorized production in the tribal areas adjacent to the NWFP which are essentially un-administered. In addition, per acre yields of licensed fields may be higher than indicated by official procurement. Total illicit production in Pakistan may be about 50 tons of raw gum annually.

The disposition of the unlicensed raw opium produced in Pakistan is unknown, but it is believed that much moves illegally through Afghanistan to Iran or into channels of trade and consumption in Pakistan itself. It is generally available locally on a black-market basis and is either eaten or, more rarely, smoked. Little if any heroin, however, is consumed in Pakistan, and none is produced as far as we know. Local use and addiction is not considered a major problem.

Substantial amounts of hashish are produced in West Pakistan, and much of it is exported illegally to Europe and the United States, often in specially prepared vehicles which are shipped from Karachi. Again, local use is not considered a major problem.

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2. DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS

Responsibility for control over production and trade of opium is divided. Provincial governments are responsible for controlling cultivation, internal movement and consumption. Major responsibility for suppressing exportation rests in the Central Excise and Land Customs, with support from Sea Customs, provincial police, and para-military forces along land borders.

We are unaware of any bilateral efforts at drug control in Pakistan beyond those mentioned below. Pakistan is a party to the Single Convention and has agreed in principle to the U.S. proposed amendments. Pakistan is a member of the ad hoc Committee on Illicit Traffic in the Near and Middle East formed during the October 1971 meeting of the Commission on Narcotic Drugs.

3. U.S. PROGRAMS

We have initiated a dialogue with the Government of Pakistan with the objective of gaining additional information about the narcotics problem and discovering cooperative bilateral or multilateral means of controlling it. We have informed the Pakistanis that we are prepared to be helpful if Pakistan decides to undertake a vigorous opium suppression effort. For several years we have had in Pakistan an AID Public Safety Program which has provided some vehicles and communications equipment to the Excise and Land Customs office in Karachi. Additional cooperative measures may result from talks currently underway.

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QUESTION: Does opium from Pakistan enter the traffic destined for United States markets?

ANSWER: So far as we know, opium from Pakistan has not found its way into the heroin traffic reaching the United States. It is of generally low quality, making it difficult to transform into heroin.

QUESTION: Why does the Government of Pakistan not exercise control in the tribal areas?

ANSWER: The tribal areas of Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province have in recent times been controlled only indirectly, first by the British, and, since 1947 by the Pakistanis. This is a remote mountainous region which is not easily accessible even with modern means of communications. Its inhabitants live according to a traditional tribal code which involves little contact as possible with outside authorities. They are armed and have their own independent system of law and order. They do not pay taxes, and can be expected to forcefully resist any effort to extend government control into their territory.

QUESTION: Is Pakistan bothered by the hippy drug groups?

ANSWER: Yes, but there has not been a large foreign hippy population resident in Pakistan recently.

QUESTION: What happens to foreigners who are arrested for violation of Pakistan narcotics regulations?

ANSWER: Pakistani courts generally decline to imprison foreigners for such offenses. Magistrates usually confiscate any vehicles involved in smuggling attempts, impose the maximum fine of Rs. 1,000 (about \$210 at the official rate of exchange), and expel the offender from the country.

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NARCOTICS COUNTRY PAPER

TURKEY

1. ILLICIT DRUG PROBLEM

Under a United Nations' convention, Turkey is one of seven countries permitted legally to grow poppies for export. However, Turkey's geographic location and historical connections with Europe have resulted in European traffickers obtaining much of their illicit opium supply from Turkey, passing it on through their smuggling teams to consumers in Europe, Latin America, and principally the U.S.

Removal of Turkey as a source of illicit supply would cause considerable disruption to established patterns of smuggling of opium and its derivative, morphine base, through Europe. It also removes a product particularly high in quality and forces processors to try to develop new sources of supply. This will force smugglers to take additional risks as they are obliged to use new contacts and transport their wares over longer and untested routes, thereby exposing them to improved enforcement activities throughout the world.

For hundreds of years, thousands of Turkish families have raised opium poppies as a legitimate cash crop. Not only are poppies grown for opium gum but as a source of food and fuel as well. About 20 to 30 percent of the crop is used solely for the purpose of obtaining poppy seeds which are important in baking and are processed into edible oil. The residual oil cake makes an excellent animal feed. The farmer thus could profit from the sale of opium gum, from the use of seed in cooking and oil extraction, from the legal sale of poppy heads to European pharmaceutical firms, and from the use of the remaining stalks for fuel. Thus, a ban on opium poppy production is a difficult decision for the Turkish Government, particularly since the poppy farmer has little, if any, knowledge of his part in the spread of the narcotic.

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2. DRUG CONTROL EFFORTS

During the past decade Turkey has reduced the area in which the opium poppy can be grown. In 1962, production was limited to 42 provinces; by 1970 it had been reduced to 7 provinces. In June 1971, Turkish Prime Minister Nihat Erim, in the annual decree governing opium poppy cultivation, announced that within one year the opium poppy would no longer be planted in Turkey. By law, the Turkish Government must announce poppy cultivation decisions one year in advance of their implementation, making the June 30 decree the strongest and most direct action legally possible for the Turkish Government to take. The June 30 decree confirmed that poppy cultivation would be allowed in only four provinces during the 1971/72 growing season, and states that a total ban would apply thereafter.

The Turkish Government has acted vigorously within its legal limits to ensure that only legitimate growers are allowed to plant poppies, and to ensure that opium gum is turned over to government purchasing offices. The Government initiated a number of measures in the spring of 1971 to improve collections. They included increasing the price the Government purchasers paid for opium gum, increasing the number of collection points in poppy growing provinces, making cash payment to farmers at the time the gum is turned in (rather than using a cumbersome voucher system), and initiating a vigorous radio and press campaign publicizing these benefits and the penalties for non-compliance. These measures, which substantially reduced the amount of gum flowing into illicit channels, are being reinforced for the final crop year.

The Government also has enacted a new licensing law which further strengthens the Government's authority over the growing process and requires farmers to provide much greater detail about the location and extent of areas planted. The law gives the Government an improved basis for licensing, controlling and collecting the final crop which includes stiff penalties for those who fail to comply.

3. U.S. PROGRAMS

Following the Government of Turkey's announcement on June 30, 1971, to ban opium cultivation, the United States

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informed the Government of Turkey that we would be prepared to provide financial assistance to help alleviate the economic difficulties resulting from the ban. Subsequently, the U. S. agreed to provide \$35 million in grant economic assistance over a three to four-year period, subject to Congressional appropriations, to support the Government of Turkey's decision to ban opium production. The funds will be used to cover legitimate foreign exchange losses resulting from the ban on opium production and to help finance development programs aimed at providing new sources of income for those farmers who will suffer the consequences of the June 30 decree. This assistance is separate from and additional to conventional assistance programs.

The U.S. also agreed to send to Turkey a high-level team of agricultural experts. In November 1971, Secretary Hardin headed such a team to assist the Government of Turkey in exploring alternate means for developing substitute income. This mission produced a joint Turkish/American report on improving farm income in the poppy growing areas. A follow-up team of AID and USDA officials returned to Turkey in February of 1972 to help prepare an action program and implementation plan. It was agreed that priority should be given to programs ready to start by the fall of 1972, and which would have an income effect by spring harvest on a large number of farmers. The U.S. team recommended that primary emphasis should be placed on introducing high-yielding varieties of wheat which could increase yields by fifty percent over conventional varieties.

In 1968, the U.S. made available a \$3 million loan to provide equipment for Turkish narcotics law enforcement agencies and for agriculture research in identifying suitable substitute crops for the opium poppy.

FY 1972

During this fiscal year the U.S. plans to obligate \$15,700,000 in support of Turkey's efforts to eradicate opium poppies. Fifteen million of this amount falls under the \$35 million pledge, and is divided into two categories -- \$5 million to cover foreign exchange losses and \$10 million for development programs in the areas affected by the ban. The U.S. also agreed to provide

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\$700,000 over and above the \$35 million pledge -- \$300,000 for the control and collection program connected with the last crop year; and \$400,000 to finance a U.S. team to work for the Government on the development of its programs for realizing substitute income for farmers affected by the ban on opium production.

FY 1973

We plan to obligate an additional \$15 million during FY 1973 against the \$35 million pledge -- \$5 million to compensate for foreign exchange losses and \$10 million for development purposes.

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QUESTION: Does the Prime Minister's statement (February 24) that Turkey has no obligation from returning to opium poppy cultivation mean that Turkey intends to reverse the ban?

ANSWER: In discussing his Government's decision the Prime Minister stressed that it was a unilateral act for which no commitment exists to prevent a return to poppy production if farmers' income loss is not overcome. We do not foresee this situation arising as programs scheduled to begin this year and those now in the planning stages to improve farm income in the affected region will ensure that new sources will replace that lost from legitimate opium sales. In this connection, the U.S. is providing \$35 million to be made available over a three to four year period to help in this task.

QUESTION: Can the Turkish Government make the ban stick and thus eliminate opium smuggling from Turkey?

ANSWER: We welcome Prime Minister Erim's strong statements in support of his decision and the follow-up actions his Government has taken to stamp out opium smuggling. These include passage of a licensing law and improved collection and law enforcement efforts. The successful elimination of cultivation in other provinces where it has been banned augers well for the implementation of a total ban.

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